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When China embarked on the "Four Modernizations" (in industry,
agriculture, defense, and science and technology) and an "open door" to
foreign trade and investment in the late 1970s, it would have been difficult
to forecast just how far the reforms might go. Nearly ten years after the
reforms began, they have proven to be both broad and deep, affecting
virtually every aspect of Chinese politics and economics.' China has
opened areas almost identical to the old treaty ports to foreign investment
and greatly expanded the number of privately owned businesses. China
has also, very tentatively, dipped its collective toes into the waters of a
legal code.
Among the legal innovations under way are the beginnings of a taxation
system, a criminal code, and a bankruptcy law. This article is concerned
with the last of these legal innovations.
Bankruptcy presents both theoretical and practical difficulties for the
Chinese political and legal system. Bankruptcy conflicts, as a matter of
theory, with communist doctrine and in theory could occur only in cap-
italist countries. As a practical matter, it is difficult for the state to allow
state-owned enterprises to go under, since this event could be interpreted
as evidence of improper planning or policy implementation by the state.
This is a particularly significant problem because a high percentage of
Chinese enterprises are state-owned. Private enterprises are the fastest-
growing segment of Chinese industry, averaging production growth rates
of 80 percent per year between 1980 and 1986.2 Even as late as 1985,
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however, some 70 percent of urban industrial output was the product of
state-owned enterprises .
As the economy has undergone reform, the degree of business risk for
both state-owned and privately owned enterprises has increased. Market
decisions have replaced centrally planned production quotas to a degree
unprecedented in post-1949 China. Many enterprises are dealing poorly
with this change in direction. In 1985, one-fifth of China's factories were
operating in the red. 4 As a result, China has cast about for methods of
saving concerns that have failed to anticipate demand for their products
or operated inefficiently. Bankruptcy is only one of these methods. For
example, China has experimented with a variant of the corporate takeover.
In the Chinese version, while ownership of the failing concern has re-
mained with the state, management responsibility has been transferred to
the purchasing factory. 5
Despite experimentation with alternatives such as corporate takeovers,
the need for a bankruptcy remedy remains. As an experiment, the city
of Shenyang, a major industrial city in Shandong Province, was allowed
to draw up regulations early in 1985 stipulating that factories must be
declared bankrupt if debts surpass assets or if accumulated losses are
more than 80 percent of fixed assets. The cities of Wuhan in central China
and Chongjing in southwest China also instituted bankruptcy regulations
in 1986.6
China's actual experience with bankruptcy is quite recent and limited.
The Shenyang Explosion-Proof Equipment Factory in Shenyang was de-
clared bankrupt on August 3, 1986, the first such declaration since the
1949 Communist takeover. 7 Bankruptcy proceedings were terminated in
November 1986.
About one month after the Shenyang bankruptcy, on December 2, 1986,
a national bankruptcy law was promulgated by the Standing Committee
of the Sixth National People's Congress. In March of 1987 the law was
put on hold indefinitely by the Congress, 8 but in 1988 the law was approved
and will go into effect in 1989. 9 This law has appeared in two different
English translations. 10
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periment, Wall St. J., Sept. I, 1987, at 37.
6. Fung, supra note 4.
7. Id.
8. Ignatius, supra note 5.
9. Ignatius, As Factory's Forced Bankruptcy Shows, China Won't Easily Accept Insol-
vencies, Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1988, at 20.
10. Boshkoff & Song, China's New Bankruptcy Law: A Translation and Brief Introduc-
tion, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 359, 362-72 (1987) (translating the Law of Bankruptcy for En-
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The bankruptcy law, coming as it does in the midst of great changes in
China's economic system, allows the capitalist concept of bankruptcy to
operate within the context of a centrally planned economy. The state
controls access to the bankruptcy process through the People's Court,
which must approve bankruptcy filings.'' Approved plans for debt re-
payment are administered by the governmental department in charge of
supervising the bankrupt enterprise. 12
The following paragraphs discuss other provisions under this "trial
implementation" 13 of bankruptcy law in China.
I. Eligibility for Bankruptcy
Eligibility for bankruptcy is limited in scope. Bankruptcy is prohibited
to: (a) individuals; (b) private enterprises; and (c) collective enterprises. 14
The only entities that may go into bankruptcy are state-owned enterprises. 15
The law does not classify state-owned enterprises by eligibility for bank-
ruptcy "chapters." Unlike U.S. law, China's law creates no subclassifi-
cations, such as amount of indebtedness, with which to classify eligible
debtors. Rather, the disparate treatment of bankrupt enterprises discussed
below in Section 11 and III flows from: a. provision for both voluntary
bankruptcy and involuntary bankruptcy; and b. provision for reorgani-
zation as an alternative to liquidation.
As a general rule, state-owned enterprises are eligible for both voluntary
bankruptcy and involuntary bankruptcy. The law imposes certain restric-
tions upon involuntary filings, however. Not eligible for involuntary filings
are stated-owned public utilities and "enterprises of major concern to the
national economy and the general welfare of all the people whose debts
are to be repaid by governmental subsidies or through other arrangements
with appropriate governmental departments."' 6 Essentially, the govern-
ment has retained the power to forestall involuntary filings against enter-
prises of "major concern" by extending subsidies or making other
terprises of the People's Republic of China); Zheng, Bankruptcy Law of the People's Re-
public of China: Principle, Procedure & Practice, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 683, 733-
40 (1986) (translating the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China);
see also Chang, The Making of the Chinese Bankruptcy Law: A Study in the Chinese
Legislative Process, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333 (1987); Peng, Characteristics of China's First
Bankruptcy Law, 28 HARV. INT'l L.J. 373 (1987) (both articles discuss the law but do not
present an English translation).
11. Boshkoff & Song, supra note 10, at 364 (translating art. 9).
12. Id. at 369 (translating art. 29).
13. The law becomes effective "on a trial basis" three months after the effective date of
the Law of Enterprises Under the Ownership of the Whole People. Zheng, supra note 10,
at 740 (translating art. 43).
14. Boshkoff & Song, supra, note 10.
15. Id. at 362 (translating art. 2).
16. Id. at 362 (translating art. 3).
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arrangements. A second exception to eligibility for involuntary bank-
ruptcy is made for enterprises that obtain a guaranty and are able to repay
their debts within six months after initiation of bankruptcy. 17
II. Bankruptcy Initiation
The bankruptcy process is begun by filing a petition with the People's
Court. The petition can be filed by creditors. The petition can also be
filed by the debtor enterprise, if it obtains the consent of the governmental
department in charge of supervising the enterprise. ' 8
A. DEBTOR-INITIATED PROCESS
The law sets out no standards for determining when a state-owned
enterprise can file a petition or for determining when the supervising
department is likely to consent. The petition is subject to approval of the
People's Court, yet again no standards for approval or disapproval appear.
Through what may be a drafting error, voluntary filings do not offer the
option of reorganization; the only course is liquidation of assets. Both the
debtor and the supervising governmental department are therefore un-
likely to file voluntarily for bankruptcy. Not only are jobs at stake, but
liquidation exposes the leaders of both the supervising department and
the debtor to sanctions if they are found to be "primarily responsible"
for the debtor's bankruptcy.19
B. CREDITOR-INITIATED PROCESS
The creditor-initiated bankruptcy process is more complex than the
voluntary process. A reading of the statute, however, suggests that it is
more likely to be employed because: a. it offers the possibility of reor-
ganization; b. the process is more accessible because the consent of the
supervising department is not required; and c. the process is more clearly
laid out.
When "creditors" 20 file a bankruptcy petition, the petition is subject
to approval of the People's Court. The law sets out no guidelines for
granting approval of a petition beyond the statutory exceptions to eligi-
17. Id. Although the statute is phrased to prohibit commencement of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings against such an enterprise, presumably the bankruptcy process must begin in order
to evaluate the debtor's ability to repay debts within six months.
18. Id. at 364 (translating art. 8).
19. Id. at 372 (translating art. 42). The liquidation process is identical for voluntary and
involuntary cases, and is discussed infra at text section III.
20. The term "creditors" is not defined. Additionally, the statute contains no provision
regarding the number of creditors or size of the claims required to initiate the petition.
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bility discussed above, and the requirement that the creditor provide
evidence that the debtor is failing to repay matured debts. 21 The conse-
quences of the People's Court withholding approval are not addressed.
When the People's Court approves the involuntary petition, the govern-
mental department supervising the debtor may intervene within three months
and request "reorganization" of the debtor. 22 In the absence of such a re-
quest and its successful pursuit, the case apparently proceeds directly to liq-
uidation. Involuntary cases also proceed directly to liquidation without
opportunity to reorganize when the enterprise cannot pay maturing debts
because "poor operation and management" have inflicted "severe losses." 23
This provision effectively limits the opportunity to reorganize to debtors not
suffering from poor management and severe losses.
The request of the supervising governmental department for "reorgan-
ization" of the debtor triggers a procedure somewhat akin to the devel-
opment of a chapter I I plan in the United States. The procedure is as
follows:
(a) the debtor enterprise 'shall propose a draft conciliation agreement [plan] to the
meeting of the creditors." 24
(b) The conciliation agreement shall propose repayment of debt in a period not ex-
ceeding two years.
2 5
(c) The creditors' committee (excluding secured creditors, who cannot vote) meets
to approve the conciliation agreement. 26
(d) When the debtor and the creditor's committee agree upon a conciliation
agreement, the People's Court, "following its confirmation of the agreement,"
suspends the bankruptcy proceeding to permit execution of the conciliation
agreement. 27 The governmental department supervising the debtor administers
the reorganization under the conciliation agreement. 28
A successful reorganization under the conciliatory agreement leads to
termination of the case. 29
21. "The creditor, when filing a bankruptcy petition, shall provide evidence of... the
failure of the debtor to repay its matured debts." Boshkoff & Song, supra note 10, at 363
(translating art. 7). Boshkoff and Song conclude from the interplay of several articles that
the creditor must also provide that the debtor's inability to repay debts is due to "poor
operation and management." Id. at 363 n.31. We do not agree, because such a construction
imputes to a petitioning creditor the proof needed to obtain a "declaration of bankruptcy"
from the People's Court prior to any reorganization attempt. In fact, a petitioning creditor
is empowered to initiate an involuntary bankruptcy without proving that a declaration of
bankruptcy is justified. See Boshkoff & Song, supra note 10, at 363, 366, 367 (translating
arts. 7, 17 & 21).
22. Id. at 366 (translating art. 17).
23. Id. at 362, 368 (translating arts. 3, 23(1)).
24. Zheng, supra note 10, at 736 (translating art. 18).
25. Id. (translating art. 17).
26. Id. at 735, 736 (translating arts. 15, 19).
27. Boshkoff & Song, supra note 10, at 366-67 (translating art. 19).
28. Id. at 367 (translating art. 20).
29. Id. (translating art. 22).
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Iii. Liquidation
If the debtor is unable to implement or complete the conciliatory agree-
ment, the court is required to issue a "declaration of bankruptcy" that
triggers liquidation of the assets. 30 Additional grounds for issuance of a
"declaration of bankruptcy" include: a. "poor operation and manage-
ment" leading to "severe losses" and inability to pay maturing debts
(discussed above); b. post-petition deterioration of financial status to-
gether with a request from the creditor's committee for termination of the
reorganization; 31 and c. misconduct of the kind set out in article 35,32
which seriously impairs the creditors' interests. If a "declaration of
bankruptcy" 33 is issued by the court, a liquidation panel is appointed
within fifteen days to take control of, manage, and distribute the debtor's
assets. The panel is composed of personnel from the supervisory gov-
ernmental department, government finance departments, and other
professionals. 34 Interestingly, the law makes no provision for represen-
tation of workers. 35 The liquidation panel has the power to reject exec-
utory contracts. The panel may also request the court to recover property
transferred before the declaration of bankruptcy but within six months
preceding the bankruptcy petition, provided that the transfer was: a. a
concealed, secret, or gratuitous transfer of assets; b. a sale of assets at
an unusually low price; c. a grant of security to previously unsecured
creditors; d. prepayment of debts not due; or e. relinquishment by the
debtor of its claims. 36 No provision is made for recovery of pre-petition
payments on existing unsecured debts, the "preferential payment" of
U.S. bankruptcy law.37 Yet payments made to some of the creditors after
30. Id. at 368 (translating art. 23).
31. Id. at 367, 368 (translating arts. 21(2), 23(2)).
32. Article 35 lists the following acts: (a) a concealed, secret, or gratuitous transfer of
assets; (b) a sale of assets at an unusually low price; (c) a grant of security to previously
unsecured creditors; (d) prepayment of debts not due; or (e) relinquishment by the debtor
of its claims. Id. at 370.
33. The "declaration of bankruptcy" has no direct counterpart in United States bank-
ruptcy law. Its closest analog may be an order of conversion to chapter 7 pursuant to I I
U.S.C. §§ 1112(b) or 1307(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), or an order refusing to confirm a
chapter I I plan of reorganization and soliciting ch. I I liquidating plans. See generally id.
§§ 1128, 1129(a), I141(d)(3)(A).
34. Boshkoff & Song, supra note 10, at 368 (translating art. 24).
35. The high point of worker involvement occurs during reorganization, when the work-
ers' representative assembly "shall be kept informed of the status of the reorganization and
its opinion concerning the reorganization should be respected." Id. at 367 (translating art.
20). Compare Zheng, supra note 1, at 736 ("The state of the reorganization shall be reported
to and comments shall be solicited from the assembly of the employee representatives.").
36. Boshkoff & Song, supra note 10, at 370 (translating art. 35).
37. See II U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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approval of the bankruptcy petition are "invalid" except as "essential"
for ordinary business operations. 38
The liquidation panel prepares a plan for distribution of the debtor's
assets. The plan, "following discussion and approval by the creditors'
committee," 39 is submitted to the court for confirmation. After the plan
is executed and all assets distributed, the court closes the case.40
IV. Automatic Stay, Claims, and Priority of Claims
Several concepts found in U.S. bankruptcy law are also found in China's
bankruptcy law. Among them are the automatic stay, a bar date for claims,
and priority among claims competing for limited funds.
A limited automatic stay is set out in article 11. This provision estab-
lishes protection for the debtor from "other civil execution" 4' after the
People's Court approves the bankruptcy petition. No provision is made
for relief from the stay. No provision stays action prior to the court's
approval of the petition.
Claims are filed after the People's Court approves the bankruptcy pe-
tition and notifies known creditors by mail and other creditors by publi-
cation. Known creditors who receive actual notice of the bankruptcy must
file their claims within one month of receipt of notice. All other creditors
have three months from the date of publication by the court (or its notice
of approval of the petition) within which to file claims. 42 Claims not timely
filed are deemed abandoned.
A secured creditor is entitled to payment "from its collateral" in the
event of liquidation. 43 A partially secured creditor participates in the gen-
eral asset distribution to the extent its claim exceeds the value of the col-
lateral. 44 Claim priority, the order in which assets are distributed to
unsecured creditors in liquidation, is set out in articles 34 and 37. First
priority is granted to the expenses of liquidation, including sale and man-
agement expenses, legal expenses, and other expenses incurred in the com-
mon interest of creditors during the bankruptcy proceeding.4 5 All these
38. Boshkoff & Song, supra note 10, at 365 (translating art. 12).
39. Id. at 371 (translating art. 37); cf. Zheng, supra note 10, at 739 (the plan "will be
discussed and adopted by the meeting of the creditors" (emphasis added)) (translating art.
37).
40. Boshkoff & Song, supra note 10, at 371 (translating art. 38).
41. Id. at 365 (translating art. 11); cf. Zheng, supra note 10, at 735 ("Upon the acceptance
of a bankruptcy case by the People's Court, all other civil enforcement procedures against
the debtor's property must terminate.")
42. Boshkoff & Song, supra note 10, at 364 (translating art. 9).
43. Id. at 370 (translating art. 32).
44. Id. at 369, 370 (translating arts. 30, 32).
45. Id. at 370 (translating art. 34).
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expenses of liquidation share common priority. If the assets are insufficient
to pay these expenses, the bankruptcy proceeding "shall" be terminated
by the court. 46 Remaining claims are granted priority in the following or-
der: a. salaries and labor insurance benefits owed by the debtor to its em-
ployees; b. taxes owed by the debtor; and c. general unsecured claims.
4 7
If assets are insufficient to completely satisfy claims in any class, they are
distributed pro rata to holders of claims in that class. Claims remaining
unpaid after closing the bankruptcy case will "no longer be satisfied."
48
V. Disciplinary Sanctions
China's bankruptcy law assigns more responsibility for failure than does
U.S. bankruptcy law. It provides in some cases for administrative disci-
plinary sanctions for parties found primarily responsible for the bank-
ruptcy and for criminal sanctions when negligence leads to great loss of
state property.
In the case of liquidation, supervising and auditing departments of the
government inquire into responsibility for the bankruptcy. If the legal
representative of the debtor, usually the debtor's director, is found "pri-
marily responsible" for the bankruptcy, he is subject to "administrative
disciplinary sanctions." 49 The nature of such sanctions is not specified.
If the governmental department supervising the debtor is primarily re-
sponsible, its leaders are likewise subject to administrative disciplinary
sanctions.50
Criminal liability will be imposed on the debtor's legal representative
and the leaders of the supervisory department if the bankruptcy is caused
by their "neglect of duty" resulting in "great loss to state property."
5
'
Article 187 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, the
relevant criminal statute, provides for a maximum of five years of
imprisonment.52
In addition, if the debtor has committed any of the acts outlined in
article 3553 (for example, fraudulent conveyances), the debtor's legal
representative and the persons directly responsible for the act are subject
46. Id.
47. Id. at 371 (translating art. 37).
48. Zheng, supra note 10, at 739 (translating art. 38).
49. Boshkoff & Song, supra note 10, at 372 (translating art. 42).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (translating the relevant criminal statute).
53. See supra note 32.
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to administrative disciplinary sanctions. If the act amounts to a crime,
they are subject to criminal liability. 54
VI. Status of Workers
The state assumes responsibility for reemploying the debtor's workers
and providing for their basic needs until such workers are reemployed. 55
These arrangements are made by the State Council. 56
VII. English Translation
The two English translations currently available contain a number of
discrepancies. Some are likely to be of little import. For example, Zheng
notes that enterprises sustaining serious loss due to "inappropriate man-
agement" are to be declared bankrupt, while Boshkoff and Song translate
this as "poor operation and management." 57
Other discrepancies are possibly more serious. For example, in defining
property of the bankruptcy estate, Zheng translates one of the definitional
phrases as "other property rights that the bankrupt enterprise should be
vested with." 58 Boshkoff and Song render the same phrase as "other
property rights belonging to the debtor." 59
VI1I. Deadlock
The statute as drafted is unfortunately silent concerning the conse-
quences of refusal or inability to participate in the manner indicated by
the statute. Many of these potential confrontations or shortcomings could
stop the bankruptcy process completely. Examples include the inability
of the debtor to propose a conciliation agreement; refusal by a creditors'
committee to approve a reorganization or liquidation plan; or refusal by
the court to approve a proposed reorganization or liquidation plan. Be-
cause no provision is made for any deviation from the narrow statutory
scheme, the process is extraordinarily vulnerable to deadlock.
54. Boshkoff & Song, supra note 10, at 372.
55. Id. at 363 (translating art. 4). In the case of the Shenyang Explosion-Proof Factory,
the workers were to get wages at progressively reduced rates for up to two years. Those
workers who did not retire were to register with the City's Labor Service Bureau for new
jobs. Fung, supra note 4.
56. The State Council is the executive branch of the central government, headed by the
Premier, currently Premier Li Peng.
57. Boshkoff& Song, supra note 10, at 362; Zheng, supra note 10, at 733 (both translating
art. 3).
58. Zheng, supra note 10, at 738 (translating art. 28).
59. Boshkoff & Song, supra note 10, at 369 (translating art. 28).
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IX. Conclusion
Neither the translation difficulties nor the obvious incompleteness of
the law in comparison with its U.S. counterpart are as important as the
law's adoption. The law is an important component of China's ongoing
economic reform movement. It introduces a requirement of fiscal disci-
pline on China's managers. Also, it provides, for the first time, for the
orderly demise of nonviable enterprises.
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